We consider the problem of signal reconstruction for a system under sparse unbounded signal corruption by an adversarial agent. The reconstruction problem follows the standard error coding problem that has been studied extensively in literature, with the added consideration of support estimation of the attack vector. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problemmerging exciting developments in the field of machine learning and estimation theory. Sufficient conditions for the reconstructability and the associated reconstruction error bounds were obtained for both exact and inexact support estimation of the attack vector. Special cases of data-driven model and linear dynamical systems were also considered.
We consider the problem of signal reconstruction for a system under sparse unbounded signal corruption by an adversarial agent. The reconstruction problem follows the standard error coding problem that has been studied extensively in literature, with the added consideration of support estimation of the attack vector. The problem is formulated as a constrained optimization problemmerging exciting developments in the field of machine learning and estimation theory. Sufficient conditions for the reconstructability and the associated reconstruction error bounds were obtained for both exact and inexact support estimation of the attack vector. Special cases of data-driven model and linear dynamical systems were also considered.
Index Terms-Compressive Sensing, Signal Reconstruction, Cyber-physical Systems, Secure Estimation, Resilient.
I. INTRODUCTION
M AJORITY of Industrial systems and critical infrastructures are Cyber-physical Systems (CPS), in that they consist of an interplay between physical components (sensors, controllers and actuators) and digital components (computational algorithms, software systems, human-machine interfaces) via communication networks. This opens up a portal that makes them prime targets of cyber malicious activities. The resilient signal reconstruction is a filtering problem for removing undesirable effects created by malicious intent as in adversarial attacks or other similar unbounded phenomenon on some of the system's monitoring nodes. For physical systems, if signal reconstruction is performed jointly on all the affected signals, then it can improve resiliency of critical infrastructure to cyber-activities and fault-induced anomalies to allow continued, safe operation [1] .
There are numerous work in literature on the secure estimation for CPS [2] - [11] . However, we focus only on the ones which are optimization based -since that is the approach taken in this work. Moreover, due to sparsity assumption on the set of attacked nodes, majority of these works are based on the classical error correction problem [12] . Given a coding matrix F ∈ R n×m with far fewer rows than columns (n ≪ m) and a vector of observed/measured quantities y ∈ R m , the coding problem is to recover a sparse vector e, e l0 < m for which y = F e. This is cast as the compressive sensing problem:
Minimize: e e l0 Subject to: y = F e.
Hayden et. al [13] obtained a sufficient condition that if all subsets of 2q columns of F are full rank, then any error e l0 ≤ q can be reconstructed uniquely by the solution of the optimization problem in (1) .
Although in some cases [6] the optimization problem in (1) is solved as is, in most cases, it does not lend itself to The work presented in this paper was done while all authors were at the GE Global Research a solution in polynomial time due to its nonconvexity. As a result, it is often replaced with its convex neighbor:
Minimize: e e l1 Subject to: y = F e.
The two programs, however, have been shown to be equivalent under the condition that the Restricted Isometric Property (RIP) holds [14] - [17] . Let
supp(e) ⊂ {1, . . . , m} be the submatrix obtained by extracting the columns of F corresponding to the indices in T . Then the S-restricted isometry constant δ S of F is defined as the smallest quantity such that
for all subsets T S with |T S | ≤ S and vector v ∈ R |TS| . This property essentially requires that every set of columns with cardinality less than S approximately behaves like an orthonormal system. Moreover, it was shown that if
then solving the optimization problem in (2) recovers any sparse signal e for which |T | ≤ S. Now, suppose there is exists an oracle which estimates the support T in advance, then the sparse vector e can estimated to an accuracy of
by the least square estimator:
where ε is the model-measurement error. Of course, if the measurement is error-free, then the estimation is exact. The goal of this work is to investigate least-square-type estimator when such oracle is available subject to both oracle and measurement uncertainties. Such oracles are termed localization oracles for the purpose of this work. The motivation for this approach stemmed from the authors' experience from working on the DOE funded program
Cyber Attack Detection and Accommodation for Energy Delivery systems
where a team of Machine Learning experts have developed such algorithm using supporting data from other sources. The question then arises "What is the best simplest thing to do to reconstruct true signals given localization information with uncertainty?". This work is an attempt to provide an answer partially to that question. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section III, the measurement model considered is presented with the basic reconstruction problem. In Section IV, some achievable bounds are proved for the reconstruction problem where the exact support of the attack vector is assumed to be provided apriori by some support estimator. In Section V, the exact support knowledge assumption is replaced by an uncertainty model derived from the ROC statistic of the support estimator and new results are obtained based on the statistical information. Special cases of data-driven model and linear dynamical systems were considered in Section VI. Finally, some future directions are highlighted in Section VII
II. NOTATION
The following notions and conventions are employed throughout the paper: R, R n , R n×m denote the space of real numbers, real vectors of length n and real matrices of n rows and m columns respectively. R + denotes positive real numbers. X ⊤ denotes the transpose of the quantity X. By Q 0, it is meant that Q is a positive semi-definite symmetric matrix, i.e x ⊤ Qx ≥ 0 ∀x = 0 and Q ≻ 0 denotes positive definiteness which is defined with strict > instead. Given Q ≻ 0, the Q-weighted norm is defined as x Q x ⊤ Qx. Normal-face lower-case letters (x ∈ R) are used to represent real scalars, bold-face lower-case letter (x ∈ R n ) represents vectors, while normal-face upper case (X ∈ R n×m ) represents matrices. Let T ⊆ {1, . . . , n} then, for a matrix X ∈ R n×m , X T ∈ R |T |×m is the submatrix obtained by extracting the rows of X corresponding to the indices in T . For a vector x, x i denotes its ith element. The symbol • denotes elementwise multiplication of two vectors and is defined as z = x • y, where z i = x i y i . supp(x) is the support of the vector x given by the set supp(x) = {i|x i = 0}. argsort ↓ (x) denotes a function that returns the sorted indices of vector x in descending order ( i.e argsort ↓ (x) = {i|x i ≥ x i+1 }) . S c denotes the complement of a set and the universal set on which it is defined will be clear from the context.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Consider the linear model:
where y, e, v ∈ R m are vectors of observation/measurements, attack/corruption due to an adversarial agent, and error term due to measurement noise/model uncertainty respectively. The matrix C ∈ R m×n a mapping from some internal state (⊆ R n ) to the output space (⊆ R m ). The following assumptions are made with respect to the model above: Assumptions • Redundancy: Measurements contain redundant information in that m > n • Bounded Noise: There exists a known ε > 0 such that
Consequently, the reconstruction problem is given by:
Minimize: e l0 + v l2 Subject to:
which is, in general, a very challenging problem to solve due to the index minimization objective and the degeneracy introduced by the complementarity constraint e ⊤ v = 0. However, if there exists a localization oracle that provides the support T = supp(e) apriori, then the reconstruction problem reduces to the unconstrained problem:
Of course, there are obvious conditions under which the solution to the above optimization problem provides no guarantee of reconstructing the actual signal. In what follows, the reconstruction error bounds are studied in more details under different conditions.
IV. RECONSTRUCTION WITH EXACT SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we examine some bounds on the reconstruction error when the attack support is known exactly. Although, the exact knowledge assumption is not pragmatic, it does give us a lower bound and a benchmark for the cases where the support is not known exactly. The following theorem examines the performance of a least-square reconstruction from partial information.
Theorem 1 (Least Square Reconstruction). Given the linear model
where y ∈ R m is a vector of measurements, x ∈ R n , n ≤ m is a vector of internal states (or features), C ∈ R m×n , and ν is the model error with the associated error bound ν ≤ ε for a known constant ε > 0.
Consider any partial measurement y T c ∈ R m1 , m 1 < n satisfying
where ν T c is the associated model error and the vector x * ∈ R n is the unknown actual internal state associated with the complete measurement set as in (6) .
The least-square estimator;
of x * , satisfies the error bound
where σ is the smallest singular value of C T c .
Proof. By the optimality ofx, it follows that
After using (7), the above inequality can be simplified and expanded as follows:
where x =x − x * . After using Young's Inequality, for some δ > 1 the above inequality yields 1 ,
From which we conclude that
Remark 1 (Rank-deficiency and RIP). Necessarily |T c | >= n, otherwise the reconstruction error x − x * is unbounded. Consequently, one can conclude that:
Although it was shown in [12] that random matrices satisfy the RIP condition with overwhelming probability, certifying such property is still an NP-hard problem [18] . In order to guarantee bounded reconstruction error for the cases where there are potential loss of row-rank after selection due to the localization oracle, we investigate the use of a special constraint in the reconstruction optimization problem.
Corollary 1 (Constrained Least Square Reconstruction). Let X ⊂ R n be a set characterized by x 1 − x 2 ≤ δ for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X and some δ > 0. Consider the constrained leastsquare estimator:
If x * ∈ X , then the reconstruction error can be upper bounded as:
Proof. Using the optimality ofx and following similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, it is shown that x − x * ≤ 2 ε 1−δn . Next, using the feasibility of both x and x * , it follows that x − x * ≤ δ. The same argument can be made for 0 < δ < 1 as well by using the Young's Inequality 2ν 
V. RECONSTRUCTION WITH INEXACT SUPPORT KNOWLEDGE
Even though, the constrained least square reconstruction described in the previous section provides guaranteed bound on the reconstruction error, it is impractical due to the exact knowledge assumption on the support estimation. Exact support knowledge alludes to a perfect localization oracle which is not possible, or extremely challenging at best, from a practical standpoint. Thus, it is imperative to understand the effect of the imperfection of the localization oracle on the reconstruction error bound. The goal of this section is to re-examine the constrained least square reconstruction with uncertain localization information.
For the unknown support T = supp(e), let the vector q be an indicator of T c and defined element-wise as:
Suppose the localization oracle gives an estimated supportT , withq similarly defined, the following uncertainty model is used:
where ǫ i is a Bernoulli random variable with mean p i whose estimate is given by the true positive rate from the localization ROC statistic. Each ǫ i ∼ B(1, p i ) captures the agreement between the estimated and actual support as
Consequently, the estimation error is characterized bỹ
Clearly, m i=1 ǫ i = m − |supp(q)| and is poisson-binomially distributed. Let r ∈ R m+1 be a vector whose elements correspond to the probability mass function of
where
and the symbol * denotes the convolution operator for vectors. Next, we seek the maximum integer l η ∈ {0, . . . , m} for which the oracle will correctly localize at least l η nodes with a probability of at least η. Explicitly, l η is given by:
where η ∈ (0, 1] is a reliability level and is set apriori.
Theorem 2. Consider the linear measurement model given in (3). Suppose there exists a localization oracle which gives an estimate,T , of supp(e) with uncertainty described by (17).
Given a reliability level η ∈ (0, 1] with corresponding integer l η given by (22), letT η be a new support with the indicatorq η (ofT c η ) obtained by randomly matching l η elements ofq while setting the remaining elements to 0. If l η −|supp(e)| ≥ n then, with a probability of at least η, the least-square estimator;
satisfies the error bound
where δ n is the n-restricted isometry constant of C ⊤ and x * ∈ R n is the unknown true internal state.
Proof. To avoid repetition, we state upfront that all claims made in this proof holds with a probability of at least η. From the definition of l η in (21), it follows thatT ≤ ε. Using the optimality of the estimator and following the same procedure as in the proof of Theorem 1 yields
where σ η is the smallest singular value of CT c η . Next, sincê |T η | ≤|T | and at least l η nodes are correctly localized byT , the following hold:
Using l η − |supp(e)| ≥ n, it follows that:
which implies that T c η ≥ n. Thus σ η can be lower bounded as σ η ≥ (1 − δ n ), from which the result follows. 
VI. CASE STUDIES

A. Data Driven Model
Suppose, instead of the linear model in (6) , one only has available the synchronous data tuple {σ i , y i }, i = 1, . . . N d , where y i ∈ R m are measurements collected from the process of interest and σ i ∈ R nσ are associated vectors of exogenous monitoring variables 3 . Let f (.; θ) : R nσ → R m be a parametrized nonlinear mapping with parameter θ selected to minimize the empirical loss function:
If N d is big enough, the residual {y i − f (σ i ; θ * )} can be assumed to be unbiased. Thus, a linear model of the uncertainty can be obtained by a subspace reduction on the residual data. This can be obtained for instance by performing a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) dimensionality reduction on the error covariance matrix
Let Φ ∈ R m×n , n < m be a matrix whose columns correspond to the first principal vectors of E. Then the data driven linear model of the process to be used for resilient reconstruction is given by
with the model error bound ν ≤ O(s n+1 ), where s k is the kth singular value of E. Thus, given T = supp(e) with |T | >= n and T c {1, . . . , m}\T , the reconstruction is obtained as follows:
with the reconstruction error given by Corollary 1 ( or Theorem 2 if T is replaced withT η ).
B. Linear Dynamical System
Next, we turn our attention to discrete linear time-invariant (LTI) systems which have been studied quite extensively in literature with respect to resilient estimation. First, we recap some results and then build on top of them using materials from previous sections.
Consider the discrete LTI system
where x k ∈ R n represents the state of the system at time k ∈ N, y k ∈ R m is the output of the monitoring nodes at time k and e k ∈ R m denote the attack signals injected by malicious agents at the monitoring nodes. Let T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , m} denote the set of attacked nodes, then for all k, |supp(e k )| ⊂ T . The resilient estimation problem is then defined as reconstructing the initial state x 0 from corrupt measurement {y k } T k=0 , T ∈ N. We look at two scenarios from literature: T is time-invariant [2] , [3] and T is time-varying [5] .
1) Secure estimation for Fixed Attacked Nodes [2] Assuming that the set T of attacked nodes is time-invariant: 
Consequently, the following optimal decoder is defined for when the set of attacked nodes is fixed:
and Φ T : R n → R m×T is a linear map given by:
2) Secure estimation for Varying Attacked Nodes [5] Assuming that the set T of attacked nodes can change with time but bounded as in |T | ≤ q: (ii) For all z ∈ R n \{0} ,
Consequently, the following optimal decoder is defined for when the set of attacked nodes is not fixed:
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that the set T of attacked nodes can change with time but bounded as in |T | ≤ q. Interested readers are referred to the reference [5] for detailed discussion of the advantage of this assumption over more traditional assumption of fixed set of attacked nodes.
3) Featurization of Observability Matrix
Given an integer n g ≤ n, consider the singular value decomposition of the observability matrix in (32) given by:
and U 2 ∈ R (n−ng )×(n−ng) . We define the PCA feature corresponding to the actual set of measurement y * (T ) as the linear transformation
which results in the measurement model
with v ≤σ ng +1 x 0 and g ∈ G, where the set G is characterized by g 1 − g 2 ≤ δ for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G andσ i is the ith biggest singular value of Φ (T ) . As will be seen later, using the feature measurement model in (35) for resilient estimation creates a tradeoff between reconstructability 4 and reconstruction error. It is also possible to use a more general nonlinear feature transform of the form g = ψ(y (T ) ), ψ(.) : R mT → R ng . This introduce additional challenge of computing the inverse function ψ −1 (.) : R ng → R mT which is not straightforward in general. However, since the scope of the present paper is limited to linear systems, the linear feature transform above turns out to be sufficient for the current work and the consideration of nonlinear feature transform for nonlinear systems is reserved for future work.
4) Robust Resilient Reconstruction
The robust resilient estimator using the feature measurement model in (35) is given by:
andT η (k) is the robust support estimate , with a reliability level η, at time k.
Theorem 3. Suppose a localization oracle, with a true positive rate p i for each node i, gives an estimated supportT . LetT η (k) be given as described in Theorem 2 (or (25)).
If l η − q ≥ n g then, with a probability of at least η, q errors are correctable by the resilient estimator given in (36). Furthermore, the estimation error is bounded as:
Proof. The result follows by following the same procedure in the proof of Theorem 2 using the measurement model in ( σ ng δ.
Remark 4. The size n g of the feature vector g creates a tradeoff between reconstructability and reconstruction error bound in that the maximum number of correctable error q max = max{q ∈ Z|q ≤ l η − n g } decreases with n g while the error bound improves (1 − δ ng increases) with n g .
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of reconstructing compromised signals for a cyber-physical system under adversarial attack is considered. The approach merges results from machine learning an estimation theory to produce and optimization-based resilient estimator. It was shown that, under certain conditions, the signals can be reconstructed even with uncertain estimation of the support of the attack vector. The basic result was applied to two special cases; data-driven model and linear time-invariant system.
Finally, we highlight some open problems for future work. There is need to validate the theoretical claims via numerical simulation and experimental setup. Extension of the results to nonlinear systems via nonlinear feature transform is an open problem and reserved for future work. The constraint in the reconstruction optimization problem is a simple quadratic constraint. In future, we plan to consider more complicated boundary function. The overall problem is set up for an openloop scenario. It remains an open question what kind of effects would be expected if the resilient estimator is cascaded with a controller in a closed-loop setting. Also, only measurement error is considered with the attack uncertainty in the measurement model. It will be beneficial to see some results pertaining to model uncertainties using popular uncertainty model like integral quadratic constraints.
